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FOURTH

AMENDMENT

When Does the Emergency Aid
Exception Permit an Officer's
Warrantless Entry of a Home?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW ofUncd ,'ttCos Suprerne C'morr (uscs, pages 414-40h8. © 2006 American Bar Association

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wis., and
a co-author of cDiscoverv
and Digital Evidence.
Ile can be reached
at jgrenig@earthlink.net
or (414) 288-5377.

ISSUES
Does the emergency aid exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement turn on an officer's
subjective motivation for entering a
home?
Was the gravity of the "emergency"
or "exigency" in this case sufficient
to justify the officers' entry into the
home without a warrant to stop a
fight?
FACTS
Around 3:00 the morning of July 23,
2001, four Brigham City police officers arrived at a local residence in
response to a complaint about a
loud party. When the officers assembled at the curb in front of the
house, they did not hear a party but
heard a commotion that "'sounded
like ... an altercation occurring,
some kind of fight." They heard
"thumping," people yelling "stop,
stop," and someone saying, "Get off
of me."
The officers walked up to the house
and looked through the front win-

dow to determine what was going
on. They saw a beer bottle on the
ledge of the front window but could
see nothing inside. Leaving one officer at the front door, the other
three officers walked to the corner
of the house and down the drive to
the backyard fence "to investigate
where [the fight] was coming from."
Peering into the backyard through
the fence, the officers saw two
teenage males drinking beer. They
heard one of the teenagers say,
"He's had too much to drink." The
officers saw no fight in the backyard
but could still hear it and "[ilt was
just as severe as when [they]
arrived and was still ongoing."
"[C]oncerned about the ongoing
fight," the officers entered the backyard. While one of them secured the
two teenagers, the other two officers
walked to the back of the house to
investigate. Through a window, the
officers saw four adults trying to
restrain a teenager against a refrigerator. The teenager's hands were
doubled into fists and he was "twisting and turning and writhing" in an
effort to break free from the grasp of
the adults. The adults were yelling
at the teenager to -'calm down,"

BRIGHAt

CITY I: STUART ET AL.

DOCKET No. 05-502

"obscenities [were] flying," and
threats were being made.
The two officers walked past a second window to an open backdoor.
The screen door was shut. After
reaching the door, an officer saw the
teenager wrest a hand free and
"land a punch squarely on the face"
of one of the adults, drawing blood.
At that point, the officer opened the
screen door and yelled, "Police."
Because it was so loud and tumultuous in the house, no one heard a
word. The officers then entered the
kitchen. An officer yelled as loudly
as he could. At that point, some of
the occupants began to realize the
police were there and the fight dissipated. The officers stepped between
the combatants and handcuffed the
teenager.
When an officer asked the adult
assault victim if he needed assistance, the adults in the house
"immediately turned and became
verbally hostile," demanding that
the officers leave. The situation
deteriorated further, and the adults
were arrested for disorderly conduct, intoxication, and contributing
to the delinquency of a minor.

immediate serious threat or created
a threat of escalating violence." The
dissenting judge observed that it "is
nonsensical to require officers,
charged with keeping the peace, to
witness this degree of violence and
take no action until they see it escalate further."
Affirming the Utah Court of
Appeals, a divided Utah Supreme
Court held that the officers' warrantless entry into the home was
not justified under the emergency
aid doctrine or under exigent circumstances. Brigham City v.
Stuart, 122 P.3d 506 (Utah 2005).
The court distinguished the two
exceptions, reasoning that emergency aid applies when officers are
motivated by a -caretaking" function and that the exigent circumstances exception applies when officers "pursu[e] a law enforcement
mission."

The adult occupants of the house
moved to suppress the evidence of
alcohol consumption found inside
the home, arguing that the officers'
entry had violated their Fourth
Amendment rights. The trial court
granted the motion to suppress, ruling that no exigent circumstances
existed justifying the officers' entry
into the residence. The trial court
ruled the officers should have
knocked on the door before entering.

The Utah court held that emergency
aid is justified if (1) police have an
objectively reasonable basis to
believe that an emergency exists
and believe there is an immediate
need for their assistance for the protection of life; (2) the search is not
primarily motivated by intent to
arrest and seize evidence; and (3)
there is some reasonable basis to
i associate the emergency with the
area or place to be searched.
According to the court, the officers
failed part one of the test because
the fight had not yet resulted in
serious bodily injury. The court also
held the officers failed part two of
the test because they were not subjectively motivated by the need to
render medicaf assistance.

On appeal, the Utah Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision. Brigham City v. Stuart, 57
P.3d 1111 (Utah App. 2002). In a 21 decision, the majority held that
nothing in the findings indicated
that "the altercation posed an

A majority of the Utah Supreme
Court held the harm that had been
inflicted was insufficient to apply
the exigent circumstances exception. The majority concluded the
officers should have knocked if they
desired to enter the home.

The city then sought review of the
Utah Supreme Court's decision by
the U.S. Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court granted the city's
petition for a writ of certiorari. 126
S.Ct. 979 (2006).

CASE ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment protects
persons from unreasonable searches
and seizures. Warrantless searches
are unreasonable but for a limited
set of exceptions. The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that a warrantless intrusion does not violate
the Fourth Amendment "'when the
exigencies of the situation' make the
needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search
is objectively reasonable." Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94
(1978). The Supreme Court has
identified several exigencies justifying warrantless intrusion, including
hot pursuit, imminent destruction
of eidence, and emergency aid.
The "exigent circumstances" doctrine justifies entry into premises
when there is probable cause to
enter for a law-enforcement purpose
but to await a warrant will either
cause the loss of evidence sought or
injury to persons or property.
The emergency aid doctrine permits
police officers, in their communitycaretaking function, to make warrantless entries and searches when
they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate
aid because the need to protect or
preserve life or avoid serious injury
is justification for what would be
otherwise illegal absent an exigency
or emergency. Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978). The
emergency circumstances doctrine
is viewed by some as independent
from exigent circumstances, and by
others as a subcategory of the exigent circumstances doctrine.

(Continued on Page 406)

American Bar Association

The rationale for the emergency aid
doctrine is that because officers
who act under the doctrine are not
conducting a law enforcement mission, the officers may do so without
either obtaining a warrant or
demonstrating the presence of probable cause or exigent circumstances. The doctrine attempts to
strike a balance between the rights
protected by the Fourth
Amendment and the interests of
government to access a dwelling to
safeguard the well-being of citizens.
Under Mincey', emergency aid intervention is justified (1) when the risk
to safety or health is life threatening, (2) when someone has suffered
a serious injury and is in need of
immediate aid, and (3) when necessary to prevent serious injury.

Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392-93. Pointing
out that the Supreme Court has not
defined "serious injury," the city
contends that the term is widely
understood to mean an injury that
results in protracted loss or impairment of the function of any body
member or organ include broken
noses, broken jaws, dangerous eye
injuries, and knocked-out teeth.
It is the city's position that emergency aid entries should be judged
against an objective standard of reasonableness. The city argues that an
officer's subjective motives are irrelevant in determining whether emergency aid is objectively reasonable,
relying on Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (holding that
the question is whether the officers'
actions are "objectively reasonable"
in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without
regard to their underlying motive or
intent). The city says the Supreme
Court has examined purpose only in
suspicionless programmatic searches, not searches that arise from, and
must be justified by, individualized
suspicion.

Disagreeing with the city, Stuart
argues that evaluating law enforcement's subjective intentions is an
integral part of Fourth Amendment
protections against warrantless
entries into a home and equally
serves the needs of law enforcement
and citizens. Stuart suggests that
the subjective standard inquires
whether the law enforcement officer
was motivated primarily by a desire
to save lives and property.

enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Mincey as forming a basis for
using the emergency aid exception
to enter a home without a warrant.
Declaring that the applicable factors
are whether somebody is in need of
immediate aid or whether evidence
would be lost, removed, or
destroyed, Stuart asserts that the
situation has to be more serious
than a minor altercation.

The city argues that police officers
are justified in entering a home to
stop ongoing crimes of violence. In
these cases, the city contends that
the government's interest in protecting others from harm converges
with its interest in stopping and preventing crime. It says that the right
and duty of police to intervene in
the face of violence was wellentrenched in the common law at
the time of the framing of our
Constitution.

In Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740
(1984), the Supreme Court held
that the gravity of the offense is relevant in determining whether an
exigency justifies a warrantless
entry. The Court in Welsh concluded that Wisconsin's driving while
intoxicated offense was not of sufficient gravity to justify a warrantless
entry because it was only a minor
offense under state law. Courts have
disagreed on the application of
Welsh. Some courts have suggested
that Welsh forecloses application of
the circumstances exception for
misdemeanor offenses. See, e.g.,
Greinerv. City of Champlin, 27
F.3d 1346, 1353 (1994) (concluding
that Welsh "casts serious doubt on
the question of whether a warrantless home arrest for a misdemeanor
will ever be deemed reasonable");
Reardon v. Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025,
1028 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding
that Welsh holds "that, at a minimum, exigent circumstances do not
exist when the underlying offense is
minor, typically a misdemeanor").
Other courts have concluded that
Welsh does not foreclose entries
based on misdemeanor offenses,
particularly where the offense
i involves violence or a risk of harm
to others. See, e.g., Joyce v. Town of
Tewksbur, 112 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir.
1997) (holding that misdemeanor
classification of assault "does not
reduce it to a 'minor offense' under
Welsh).

According to Stuart, a minor misdemeanor does not rise to the level

The city argues that the officers'
entry into the home was reasonable

According to the city, a warrantless
entry to stop a fight in progress is
justified by the government's legitimate and substantial interests in
protecting the public from harm and
in preventing crimes of violence. It
says that emergency aid is justified
by the need to protect and preserve
life, to administer medical aid for a
serious injury, and to prevent serious injury. The city claims any
physical altercation involving adults,
or even teenagers, creates a real and
substantial risk that serious injury
may result. While serious injuries do
not inevitably result, the city states
the risk is real and substantial and
justifies emergency aid intervention
to prevent them. In the face of these
inherent risks, the city declares that
the Fourth Amendment does not
require an officer "to simply shrug
his shoulders" and allow the violence to continue.
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under the Fourth Amendment. It
points out that arriving at the front
curb, the officers heard an altercation occurring, they heard some
thumping, and they heard people
yelling. The city says the altercation
continued with no drop in intensity
as the officers investigated first from
the front window, then from the driveway, and finally from the backdoor. The city claims the officers'
warrantless entry into the home was
justified by the need to quell the
ongoing violence and to prevent further harm to those inside. Because
the altercation was in the kitchen,
the city suggests the officer could
reasonably believe that a knife
could be pulled from a nearby
kitchen drawer, elevating the potential severity of physical harm that a
participant in the fight-or an innocent bystander-could suffer.
Pointing out that the officers stood
outside the home, and only misdemeanor offenses, and no assault
offenses, were charged, Stuart says
the requisite level of necessity was
not reached to permit entering a
home under Mincey. Stuart declares
there was no immediate need for
help, and there was no likelihood
that any evidence would be lost,
removed, or destroyed.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court is asked to
decide a question it left unresolved
in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978): the standard by which
emergency aid entries should be
judged. Courts are deeply divided
on this issue. Some courts strictly
adhere to the objective standard traditionally applied in Fourth
Amendment cases. Other courts
apply a subjective standard test,
examining an officer's motivations
for taking action. The Supreme
Court is also faced with an issue
that has troubled lower courts since
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740

(1984): how serious must the harm
or wrongdoing be to justify a warrantless entry?
Three circuits have agreed with the
Utah Supreme Court, holding that
because emergency aid intrusions
are justified upon a showing of reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, examination of an officer's subjective motives is appropriate to safeguard against pretextual
searches. United States v. Thomas,
372 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir.
2004); United States v. Cervantes,
219 F.3d 882, 889-90 (9th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 912
(2001); United States v. Borchardt,
809 F.2d 1115, 1117 (5th Cir.
1987). See also State v. Fisher,686
P.2d 750, 759-61 (Ariz.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1066 (1984);
People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 932-39
(Cal. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1187 (2000); State v. Drennan, 101
P.3d 1218, 1231-32 (Kan. 2004);
State v. Plant, 461 N.W.2d 253, 26263 (Neb. 1990); State v. Ryon, 108
P.3d 1032, 1046 (N.M. 2005); People
v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y
1976) People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d
607 (N.Y 1976); Lubenow v. North
Dakota State Hwy. Comm'r, 438
N.W.2d 528, 531-33 (N.D. 1989);
State v. Heumiller, 317 N.W.2d 126,
129 (S.D. 1982); State v. Mountford,
769 A.2d 769 A.2d 639, 645 (Vt.
2000); State v. Kinzy 5 P.3d 668,
675-78 (Wash. 2000) (en banc),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1104 (2001);
State v. Boggess, 340 N.W2d 516,
521-22 (Wis. 1983).
Two circuits have applied the objective standard in emergency entry
cases. In re United States v. Chipps,
410 F.3d 438, 442 (8th Cir. 2005);
Sealed Case 96-3167, 153 F.3d 759,
766 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See also
Wofford v. State, 952 S.W.2d 646,
651 (Ark. 1997); People v. Hebert,
46 P.3d 473, 478-80 (Colo. 2002)
(en bane); State v. Blades, 626 A.2d
273, 278 (Conn. 1993); State v.

Carlson, 548 N.W.2d 138, 141-42
(Iowa 1996); State v. Othoudt, 482
N.W2d 218, 223 (Minn. 1992);
State v. Scott, 471 S.E.2d 605, 61315 (N.C. 1996).
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740 (1984), courts have been divided as to the gravity of the "emergency" or "exigency" that must
exist to justify a warrantless search.
Some cases have suggested that an
emergency aid entry is justified
whenever a person's safety or health
is in danger. Other cases suggest a
more demanding standard, permitting entry to prevent serious injury
or harm.
The Supreme Court should resolve
these conflicts among the courts in
deciding this case. In addition, with
a new chief justice and a new justice on the Supreme Court, this
term, this case may provide insight
on how the Court will approach
search and seizure cases.
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